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Summary
Background The WHO declared the 2014 west African Ebola epidemic a public health emergency of international 
concern in view of its potential for further international spread. Decision makers worldwide are in need of empirical 
data to inform and implement emergency response measures. Our aim was to assess the potential for Ebola virus to 
spread across international borders via commercial air travel and assess the relative eﬃ  ciency of exit versus entry 
screening of travellers at commercial airports.
Methods We analysed International Air Transport Association data for worldwide ﬂ ight schedules between Sept 1, 2014, 
and Dec 31, 2014, and historic traveller ﬂ ight itinerary data from 2013 to describe expected global population 
movements via commercial air travel out of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Coupled with Ebola virus surveillance 
data, we modelled the expected number of internationally exported Ebola virus infections, the potential eﬀ ect of air 
travel restrictions, and the eﬃ  ciency of airport-based traveller screening at international ports of entry and exit. We 
deemed individuals initiating travel from any domestic or international airport within these three countries to have 
possible exposure to Ebola virus. We deemed all other travellers to have no signiﬁ cant risk of exposure to Ebola virus.
Findings Based on epidemic conditions and international ﬂ ight restrictions to and from Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone as of Sept 1, 2014 (reductions in passenger seats by 51% for Liberia, 66% for Guinea, and 85% for 
Sierra Leone), our model projects 2·8 travellers infected with Ebola virus departing the above three countries via 
commercial ﬂ ights, on average, every month. 91 547 (64%) of all air travellers departing Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone had expected destinations in low-income and lower-middle-income countries. Screening international travellers 
departing three airports would enable health assessments of all travellers at highest risk of exposure to Ebola virus 
infection.
Interpretation Decision makers must carefully balance the potential harms from travel restrictions imposed on 
countries that have Ebola virus activity against any potential reductions in risk from Ebola virus importations. Exit 
screening of travellers at airports in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone would be the most eﬃ  cient frontier at which to 
assess the health status of travellers at risk of Ebola virus exposure, however, this intervention might require 
international support to implement eﬀ ectively. 
Funding Canadian Institutes of Health Research.
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Introduction
On Aug 8, 2014, and for only the third time in the 
agency’s history, the WHO declared a public health 
emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to unite 
the global community in its eﬀ orts to bring the current 
epidemic of Ebola virus in west Africa under control.1 
Key factors inﬂ uencing the declaration were the 
unprecedented scale and geographic range of the 
epidemic coupled with the constrained public health 
capacity of aﬀ ected countries, high fatality ratio, and 
the observed international spread of Ebola virus 
into Nigeria–Africa’s most populous country, with a 
population of more than 170 million.2 Coordinated 
international action to control the epidemic at its source 
is mounting; however, uncoordinated unilateral actions 
are also emerging including controversial measures that 
ban travel and trade to and from aﬀ ected countries.3
The 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) 
describe the guiding principles by which 196 participating 
countries are bound when responding to a PHEIC, such as 
the current Ebola epidemic. The purpose and scope of the 
IHR are to “prevent, protect against, control and provide a 
public health response to the international spread of 
disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted 
to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary 
interference with international traﬃ  c and trade”.4 However, 
evidence is missing to help decision makers objectively 
and dispassionately balance the reduction in risk to 
unaﬀ ected countries by restricting international travel 
from areas aﬀ ected by Ebola virus, against the possible 
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humanitarian and public health consequences to countries 
currently in the midst of the epidemic. Using empirical 
data for global population mobility via air travel, Ebola 
virus surveillance, and health-care system capacity, we 
aimed to oﬀ er perspective on the potential for Ebola virus 
to spread across international borders via commercial air 
travel, assess the relative eﬃ  ciency of exit versus entry 
screening of travellers at commercial airports, and assess 
the capacity of receiving areas to eﬀ ectively detect and 
respond to potential imported cases.
Methods
Overview and data sources
We studied patterns of commercial air travel out of 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the three countries 
with widespread and intense Ebola virus transmission as 
of Sept 1, 2014,5 which we deemed the most likely sources 
of exported infections of Ebola virus. For our travel 
analyses, we used two complementary datasets from the 
International Air Transport Association, representing the 
most up-to-date data currently available. The ﬁ rst dataset 
includes information on future ﬂ ight schedules (ie, 
passenger carrying capacity as seats on ﬂ ights between 
directly connected airports), which we used to describe all 
non-stop ﬂ ights out of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone 
between September, 2014, and December, 2014. The 
second dataset includes monthly, passenger-level ﬂ ight 
itinerary data from September, 2013, to December, 2013, 
which we used to describe the expected ﬁ nal destinations 
of travellers departing Ebola virus aﬀ ected countries 
while accounting for all traveller ﬂ ight connections.
International air travel out of areas aﬀ ected by Ebola virus
We ﬁ rst quantiﬁ ed the total volume of international 
commercial air travellers departing every country in the 
world in 2013, highlighting Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
the four neighbouring countries that share a land border 
(Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Senegal), and 
Nigeria. To estimate how international air traﬃ  c ﬂ ows to 
and from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have changed 
due to the Ebola epidemic, we calculated the reduction in 
total aircraft seat capacity based on online media reports 
of airline ﬂ ight cancellations and travel restrictions 
imposed by countries as of Sept 1, 2014.
We then analysed the ﬂ ight itineraries of all international 
travellers departing Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone 
between September, 2013, and December, 2013, and 
mapped the ﬁ nal destinations of these travellers (ESRI 
ArcGIS v10), indicating which cities are scheduled to 
receive non-stop ﬂ ights between September, 2014, and 
December, 2014. We deemed individuals initiating travel 
from any domestic or international airport within these 
three countries to have possible exposure to Ebola virus. 
We deemed all other travellers, including those simply 
transiting through Guinea, Liberia, or Sierra Leone, or 
originating from Nigeria or Senegal (where at the time of 
writing no evidence of widespread community-based 
transmission was reported), to have no signiﬁ cant risk of 
exposure to Ebola virus. Although no new cases have 
been reported in Nigeria since early September, because 
of the potential for new or undetected cases appearing, 
we separately assessed global air traﬃ  c patterns out of 
Lagos and Port Harcourt, Nigeria (which collectively 
include 540 812 travellers, 81% of Nigeria’s international 
air traﬃ  c volume in 2013).
We then quantiﬁ ed the number of travellers needed to 
be screened to capture one traveller potentially exposed to 
Ebola virus (deﬁ ned as any individual initiating travel from 
an airport within Guinea, Liberia, or Sierra Leone) and 
compared the number of cities in which traveller screening 
would be required to detect all potentially exposed 
travellers. This analysis included options for screening at: 
international points of departure from Guinea, Liberia, or 
Sierra Leone (exit-screening); international points of arrival 
on non-stop ﬂ ights arriving from Guinea, Liberia, or 
Sierra Leone (entry-screening for direct ﬂ ights); and 
international points of arrival via connecting ﬂ ights (ie, 
airports receiving travellers via multisegment ﬂ ights 
originating from these three countries; entry-screening 
for indirect ﬂ ights). To estimate the likelihood of an 
asymptomatic air traveller infected with Ebola virus (in the 
incubation period) developing detectable symptomatic 
illness during the course of an international ﬂ ight, we 
calculated the median (IQR) and mean (SD) of travel times 
for all potential travellers exposed to Ebola virus to reach 
their ﬁ nal destination. We assumed a 1 h layover for 
domestic ﬂ ights and a 2 h layover for international ﬂ ights.
Projections of international Ebola virus spread
To estimate the potential for international spread of 
Ebola virus out of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone via 
commercial air travel between September, 2014, and 
December, 2014, we used the number of active cases 
(deﬁ ned as conﬁ rmed, probable, or suspected cases 
within the 21 day period before Sept 21, 2014, as reported 
by WHO), World Bank 2013 country population 
estimates, and the monthly number of international 
outbound air travellers between September, 2013, and 
December, 2013 (ie, pre-outbreak ﬂ ows) to calculate 
expected numbers of Ebola virus exportations (ie, 
[number of active cases/country population] × monthly 
number of international outbound air travellers).5 We 
then estimated the expected time in months for one air 
traveller infected with Ebola virus to depart the above 
three countries (ie, 1/expected number of Ebola virus 
exportations per month). This method assumed ﬂ ows of 
international travellers before the outbreak (ie, 2013), a 
homogeneous distribution, and constant prevalence of 
Ebola virus infection in the general population, an equal 
risk of infection between travellers and non-travellers, 
and no under-reporting of cases of Ebola virus. In view of 
existing uncertainties, we did sensitivity analyses to 
explore scenarios of increasing case burden (2×, 5×, 10×), 
exponential risk in case burden over time,6 and 
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decreasing international air traﬃ  c capacity due to ﬂ ight 
cancellations, travel restrictions, or changes in travel 
behaviours (50%, 75% reduction; appendix).
Traveller destinations and Health System Capacity
As a crude surrogate marker for health-care capacity, we 
examined the World Bank income group (ie, low-income, 
lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income, or high-
income country) of the ﬁ nal destinations of travellers 
departing Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.7 Destination 
cities of travellers were aggregated to the country level 
and also compared with selected national indicators of 
health-care system capacity from the World Bank (eg, 
health-care expenditures per head, physicians per 1000 
people, hospital beds per 1000 people) to identify 
countries with high levels of connectivity to Ebola virus 
aﬀ ected areas but with constrained health-care resources.7
Role of the funding source:
The funder of the study had no role in study design, data 
collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of 
the report. The corresponding author had full access to 
all the data in the study and had ﬁ nal responsibility for 
the decision to submit for publication.
Results
In 2013, 0·02% (183 485 travellers) of the world’s 
total commercial international air traﬃ  c volume 
(1 105 005 867 individuals) were air travellers departing 
Guinea, 0·02% (163 274 individuals) were air travellers 
departing Sierra Leone, and 0·01% (148 101 individuals) 
were air travellers departing Liberia (ﬁ gure 1). Countries 
sharing a land border with Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone also had low volumes of international air 
traﬃ  c, whereas Nigeria accounted for about four times 
the volume of international air travel from the above 
three countries combined. Reported ﬂ ight cancellations 
and restrictions as of Sept 1, 2014, reduced scheduled 
commercial air traﬃ  c capacity (between Sept 1, 2014, and 
Dec 31, 2014) to and from Liberia by 51%, Guinea by 
66%, and Sierra Leone by 85%.
We found that health screening of travellers at risk of 
exposure would be most eﬃ  cient if done at international 
points of departure from countries with community-based 
transmission of Ebola virus (table 1). Exit screening 
travellers at airports in three cities (ie, Conakry, Monrovia, 
and Freetown) would allow for health assessments of all 
travellers departing Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. By 
comparison, entry screening the very same travellers as 
they arrive in other countries via non-stop international 
ﬂ ights (ie, entry screening of direct ﬂ ights) would require 
intervention in 15 cities across 15 countries. Of the 
commercial airports in 1238 cities worldwide that do not 
receive direct ﬂ ights from Guinea, Liberia, or Sierra Leone, 
an average of 2512 travellers would have to be screened (or 
their trip itineraries examined) to identify one traveller 
originating from one of the above three countries. We also 
found the median travel times on non-stop ﬂ ights out of 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to be 2·7 h (IQR 
2·0–6·1), making it unlikely that an infected individual 
who was asymptomatic at exit screening would develop 
symptoms during their ﬂ ight; hence the expected 
Figure 1: Global volume of international air traveller departures by country, 2013
Countries are shown in decreasing order of air traﬃ  c volume. Countries sharing a land border with Guinea, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone are shown by green arrows. A1=Senegal (1 022 058; 0·09% of total volume). A2=Côte d’Ivoire 
(663 438; 0·06% of total volume), A3=Mali (325 983; 0·03% of total volume). A4=Guinea-Bissau (45 702; <0·01% 
of total volume).
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Country
USA
89 240 376 (8·08% of total volume)
A1 A2 A3 A4
UK
78 553 785 (7·11% of total volume)
Germany
57 737 835
(5·23% of total volume)
Nigeria
1 965 943
(0·18% of total volume)
Liberia
148 101
(0·01% of total volume)
Sierra Leone
163 274
(0·02% of total volume)
Guinea
183 485
(0·02% of total volume)
Exit screening Entry screening of 
direct ﬂ ights
Entry screening of 
indirect ﬂ ights
Number of cities where screening 
would be required
3* 15† 1238
Estimated number of travellers who 
would be screened
144 798 144 798 362 855 926
Estimated number of low-risk‡ 
travellers who would be screened (%)
376 (0·1%) 376 (0·1%) 362 711 504 (99·9%)
Number of travellers needed to screen 
to assess one traveller with potential 
exposure to Ebola virus§
1 1 2512
Travel time until screening, h
Median (IQR) 0 2·7 (2·0–6·1) 4·0 (2·0–7·6)¶
Mean (SD) 0 3·9 (2·6) 5·8 (4·9)
Data include travellers departing Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and travellers on connecting ﬂ ights departing these 
countries. Data are based on air traveller ﬂ ows reported from Sept 1, 2013, to Dec 31, 2013. *Four international 
airports in three cities across three countries (since these countries do not have any solely domestic airport this number 
represents all airports in the three countries); one airport in Monrovia has since been closed. †16 airports in 15 cities 
across 15 countries. ‡We deﬁ ned low-risk travellers as any traveller with an origin outside Guinea, Liberia, or Sierra 
Leone, including those simply transiting through these countries. §We deﬁ ned travellers with possible exposure to 
Ebola virus as individuals initiating travel from any domestic or international airport within Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone. Travellers transiting through airports within Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone or initiating travel from 
Senegal or Nigeria were not deemed to have such an exposure risk. ¶We assumed a 1 h layover for domestic ﬂ ights and 
a 2 h layover for international ﬂ ights.
Table 1: Eﬃ  ciency of airport-based interventions to screen international travellers departing Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone by frontier 
See Online for appendix
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incremental usefulness of entry screening in addition to 
eﬀ ective exit screening would be very low.
Assuming pre-outbreak and unrestricted travel 
conditions and no health screening of travellers (and the 
model assumptions described in the methods’ section), 
we estimated one infected international air traveller 
would leave Guinea every 2∙7 months, Liberia every 
0∙2 months, and Sierra Leone every 0∙6 months (table 2). 
The appendix shows diﬀ erent scenarios of increasing 
Ebola virus case burden in the source countries and 
decreasing air traﬃ  c volumes.
When analysed by World Bank income category, 
42 825 (29%) travellers coming from these three countries 
had ﬁ nal destinations in high-income countries, 
10 041 (7%) in upper-middle income countries, 70 182 (49%) 
in lower-middle income countries, and 21 365 (15%) in 
low-income countries. Figure 2 and the appendix show 
the ﬁ nal destinations of air travellers departing Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone at the city level, with Accra, 
Dakar, and London at the top 3. Table 3 shows the most 
common ﬁ nal destination countries of individuals 
initiating air travel from within Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone, with potential national indicators of 
health-care capacity. Separately, the appendix shows 
anticipated ﬁ nal destinations of air travellers departing 
Lagos and Port Harcourt, Nigeria, with London, Dubai, 
and Accra at the top 3.
Discussion
In accordance with the central tenets of the IHR (2005)—
a global treaty ratiﬁ ed by the World Health Assembly—
the international community has agreed to respond to 
global infectious disease threats in ways that carefully 
balance the potential beneﬁ ts and possible harms from 
Population 
estimates*
Number 
of active 
cases†
Estimated 
prevalence 
(per 100 000)
Number of monthly 
international travellers 
(outbound, 
unrestricted air travel)‡
Projected number of 
infected travellers per 
month (outbound, 
unrestricted air travel)§
Projected time to 
one internationally 
exported case 
(unrestricted air travel)
Projected time to 
one internationally 
exported case 
(restricted air travel)¶
Guinea 11 745 189 292 2·49 14 732 0·37 2·7 months 8·0 months
Liberia 4 294 077 1707 39·75 12 781 5·08 0·2 months 0·4 months
Sierra Leone 6 092 075 737 12·10 14 237 1·72 0·6 months 3·9 months
Total 22 131 341 2736 18·11 (19·3)** 41 750 7·17 0·14 months 0·35 months
*Source: World Bank, 2013. †Sum of the number of conﬁ rmed, probable, and suspected cases in the past 21 days to estimate active cases as of Sept 21, 2014. ‡Based on 
average traveller volumes recorded between Sept 1, 2013, to Dec 31, 2013; includes international travel between Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. §Model assumptions 
include: Ebola virus disease activity is constant and equally distributed across the population; an individual’s risk of Ebola virus infection is independent of the probability of 
international air travel; we calculated projected numbers of internationally outbound travellers infected with Ebola virus using the following formula: [number of active 
cases/country population] × monthly number of international outbound air travellers); we calculated the time to one internationally exported case as the inverse of the 
projected number of Ebola virus exportations per month (using case counts as of Sept 21, 2014). ¶We assumed a reduction in international air travel volume of 51% for 
Liberia, 66% for Guinea, and 85% for Sierra Leone. **Represent mean value (SD) for the three countries.
Table 2: Modelled estimates of Ebola virus exportation from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone via commercial air travel
Traveller volumes
 101–500
 501–1000
 1001–5000
 5001–10 000
 10 001–30 000
 Non-stop flights
 Countries with widespread
 and intense EV transmission
Brussels
5541
Paris
8647
Abidjan
8266
Accra
25 267
Dakar
20 805
Banjul
9849
Casablanca
7514
London
11 063
Figure 2: Final traveller destinations, passenger volumes * and scheduled non-stop ﬂ ights† departing Guinea, Liberia, an d Sierra Leone
*From Sept 1, 2013, to Dec 31, 2013. †From Sept 1, 2014, to Dec 31, 2014.
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public health interventions that interfere with 
international traﬃ  c and trade.4 In this study, we aimed to 
support policy makers in making informed decisions 
about travel-related interventions that could decrease 
risks to currently unaﬀ ected countries but which could 
concurrently have adverse economic, health, social and 
humanitarian consequences to aﬀ ected countries (panel).
We determined that the volume of international air 
traﬃ  c departing the three countries facing widespread 
community-based transmission of Ebola virus disease, 
namely Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, was low 
relative to other countries. To study the potential for 
Ebola virus exportation, however, these numbers must 
be considered in the context of potential travel 
restrictions, the intensity of Ebola virus activity in 
aﬀ ected countries, and the underlying assumptions of 
our model. As shown in our analysis and witnessed by 
the imported case of Ebola virus into Nigeria and the 
USA, the potential for further international spread via air 
travel remains present. Of additional concern is that the 
anticipated destinations of more than 60% of travellers 
departing Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are to 
low-income or lower-middle income countries, where 
inadequately resourced medical and public health 
systems might be unable to detect and adequately 
manage an imported case of Ebola virus disease, 
including possible subsequent community spread.8
One intervention, which could help maintain crucial 
supply chains into aﬀ ected countries but mitigate the 
risk of international spread of disease, is the use of 
non-commercial ﬂ ights to transport essential personnel 
and materials. For commercial ﬂ ights, airport-based 
traveller screening, which can be done at the point of exit 
(departure) from or entry (arrival) to an airport can be 
considered. Exit screening would help identify travellers 
with symptoms consistent with Ebola virus disease at an 
earlier stage than entry screening,9 whereas both would 
miss latent infections during the 8–10 day average (range 
2–21 day) incubation period.
Our analyses show that exit screening at international 
points of departure would oﬀ er greater eﬃ  ciency, and 
might be simpler to operationalise, than entry screening 
all ﬂ ights arriving directly from aﬀ ected countries. By 
comparison, entry screening at international airports to 
which no direct ﬂ ights are arriving from aﬀ ected 
countries would be highly ineﬃ  cient if border authorities 
are unable to easily identify which travellers originated 
from countries currently experiencing community-based 
Ebola virus transmission.
Furthermore, in view of the non-speciﬁ c symptoms of 
early Ebola virus infection, the predictive value of a 
positive health screening test would be extremely low, 
regardless of its sensitivity or speciﬁ city (ie, likelihood 
that a positive screening test would represent Ebola virus 
disease). Hence, screening travellers on multisegment 
ﬂ ights to their ﬁ nal destination would probably have 
minimum beneﬁ ts to unaﬀ ected countries but could 
incur important opportunity costs. Moreover, the short 
ﬂ ight durations out of aﬀ ected countries, compared with 
the much longer incubation period of Ebola virus, 
indicates that if exit screening from aﬀ ected countries 
were implemented eﬀ ectively, the incremental gains 
from additional entry screening would be negligible. On 
Aug 8, 2014, the WHO proposed the use of exit 
screening.10 However, since exit screening is likely to 
further draw on valuable health and human resources 
from resource-poor countries in the midst of an 
emergency,11,12 support from the international community 
will be necessary to eﬀ ectively implement these 
recommendations. For maximum eﬃ  cacy, any screening 
programme should be coupled with strategies for the 
early detection of imported cases.
Although not directly assessed in this study, educational 
and communication strategies could be used to further 
reduce the risk of international spread of Ebola virus or to 
rapidly identify new imported cases. These strategies 
could include advice for individuals before travelling, with 
emphasis on international aid workers and foreign-born 
diaspora populations returning home to visit friends and 
relatives in aﬀ ected areas. In some cases, international aid 
workers have agreed to a self-imposed 21-day monitoring 
period post-return from aﬀ ected countries.13,14 Travellers 
Traveller 
volume*
Proportion 
of total 
volume 
(%)
Health-system capacity measures (global rank out of 
191 countries)
Health-care 
expenditure 
per head, US$†
Physicians 
per 1000 
people†
Nurses and 
midwives per 
1000 people†
Hospital 
beds per 
1000 people†
Ghana 25 272 17·5% 83 (149) 0·1 (135) 0·9 (116) 0·9 (142)
Senegal 20 818 14·4% 51 (158) 0·1 (135) 0·4 (140) 0·3 (165)
UK 12 493 8·7% 3647 (20) 2·8 (42) 8·8 (23) 2·9 (69)
France 10 292 7·1% 4690 (14) 3·2 (31) 9·3 (19) 6·4 (15)
Gambia 9849 6·8% 26 (177) 0 (152) 0·6 (130) 1·1 (134)
Côte d’Ivoire 8266 5·7% 88 (147) 0·1 (135) 0·5 (136) NA
Morocco 7574 5·2% 190 (119) 0·6 (104) 0·9 (116) 0·9 (142)
Belgium 5541 3·8% 4711 (13) 3 (34) 15·8 (4) 6·5 (13)
Nigeria 4182 2·9% 94 (144) 0·4 (110) 1·6 (100) NA
China 4090 2·8% 322 (100) 1·9 (67) 1·9 (92) 3·8 (49)
Mali 3680 2·5% 42 (164) 0·1 (135) 0·4 (140) 0·1 (168)
USA 2927 2·0% 8895 (3) 2·5 (52) 9·8 (18) 2·9 (69)
India 2466 1·7% 61 (153) 0·7 (102) 1·7 (96) 0·7 (149)
Kenya 2392 1·7% 45 (162) 0·2 (122) 0·8 (121) 1·4 (123)
Germany 1825 1·3% 4683 (15) 3·8 (14) 11·5 (12) 8·2 (6)
Lebanon 1706 1·2% 675 (62) 3·2 (31) 2·7 (81) 3·5 (55)
South Africa 1558 1·1% 645 (64) 0·8 (99) 4·9 (55) NA
Guinea-Bissau 1340 0·9% 30 (175) 0 (152) 0·6 (130) 1 (139)
Canada 1299 0·9% 5741 (8) 2·1 (61) 9·3 (19) 2·7 (75)
Italy 1293 0·9% 3032 (23) 4·1 (9) 0·3 (145) 3·4 (60)
NA=No data available. *From Sept 1, 2013, to Dec 31, 2013. †2007–12 estimates from World Bank.
Table 3: Top 20 ﬁ nal destination countries of individuals initiating air travel from within Guinea, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone and corresponding indicators of health system capacity
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visiting friends and relatives might also be at increased 
risk of exposure to Ebola virus, for example if they are 
visiting ill relatives or attending funerals.15
In addition to the use of air traﬃ  c patterns to identify 
global geographies at increased risk of Ebola virus 
importation, public health oﬃ  cials could make use 
of national demographic data to proactively engage 
foreign-born diaspora populations from countries 
currently aﬀ ected by Ebola virus. Targeted programmes 
to inform and educate populations on how to detect 
symptoms and avoid infection could be explored. For 
example, the Liberian man with Ebola virus disease 
who travelled to Nigeria was planning to return home 
to Minneapolis, home to the largest Liberian population 
in the USA.16 Such demographic data, however, must 
be used responsibly and preventatively to target 
educational eﬀ orts and not to stigmatise foreign-born 
populations.
Our study is limited by the absence of demographic data 
for air travellers or their intended purpose for travel, which 
is related to the risk of disease acquisition. For example, 
most business travellers or airline personnel travelling to 
or from the region would be unlikely to have direct contact 
with blood or body ﬂ uids from infected people, whereas 
this contact might be more likely for foreign health-care 
workers involved in epidemic response, particularly if 
breaches in infection control occur. Because of the absence 
of such data, we assumed that the risk of exposure to Ebola 
virus was uniform across the entire population and similar 
for travellers and non-travellers. This assumption might 
inﬂ ate our risk estimates since air travel is generally 
conﬁ ned to higher socioeconomic groups who might be at 
lower risk of exposure than people in low socioeconomic 
groups. Conversely, our risk estimates could be 
underestimated, since we did not account for under-
reporting of cases. Finally, our estimates of traveller ﬂ ows 
were based on historical data and might not portray the 
most current patterns of travel, which are continuously 
evolving because of changes in airline ﬂ ight cancellations, 
imposed border closings, and global travel behaviours. 
Results from an analysis17 of global travel behaviours 
during the H1N1 inﬂ uenza pandemic showed that the 
volume of air traﬃ  c into Mexico decreased by about 40% at 
the height of the pandemic. Although our model of Ebola 
virus exportations is simple, readers can use the data 
provided (table 2) to build their own scenarios as Ebola 
virus epidemic conditions progress by updating or 
projecting active case counts or traveller volumes, or both. 
Finally, our analysis does not take into consideration 
ground travel, which is an important source of population 
mobility within this region, and is likely to be associated 
with local transmission, as seen with the recent imported 
case into Senegal.1,18 Although this limitation restricts our 
ability to model risks of spread within currently aﬀ ected 
countries, and to some extent those sharing a contiguous 
land border, our analysis is more oriented to a worldwide 
perspective.
The extremely high virulence of Ebola virus, the 
absence of antiviral drugs or vaccines that have been 
proven to be safe and eﬀ ective, and the recorded 
instances of international spread of Ebola virus infection 
via air travel to Lagos, Nigeria, and Dallas, USA, have led 
some countries to try and mitigate their risks of disease 
importation by restricting air travel.19,20 Since the most 
proactive and preventive approach to minimise risks to 
the global community involves control of the epidemic at 
its source, excessive constraints in connectivity could 
have severe economic consequences that could 
destabilise the region (several countries have only 
recently recovered from long civil wars),21 and possibly 
disrupt crucial supply chains of food and other essential 
services.22 Our analysis aims to help countries balance 
these competing risks in the context of their capacity to 
eﬀ ectively detect and manage Ebola virus importations.
Countries have been screening travellers arriving at 
their borders for centuries to protect their own health, 
security, and economic interests. However, in a world 
where the beneﬁ ts of interconnectedness and the risks of 
interdependence are deeply intertwined, public health 
interventions to global threats made by individual 
countries must use the best available evidence to be 
“commensurate with and restricted to public health risks 
and avoid unnecessary interference with international 
traﬃ  c and trade.”4
Panel: Research in context
Systematic Review
We searched Medline for relevant published articles on the current Ebola epidemic, the 
role of commercial air travel in the international spread of infectious diseases, and the 
2005 International Health Regulations in relation to global epidemic threats. We used the 
terms “Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola” OR “Air Travel” OR “International Health Regulations” 
OR “World Health” using the Medline database from January, 1996, to September, 2014. 
We also searched for online media related to the current Ebola epidemic using Google 
News, focusing on articles describing ﬂ ight cancellations by commercial airlines and travel 
restrictions implemented by countries not experiencing Ebola activity. Finally, we 
searched the WHO website for Ebola Situation Updates and Ebola Response Roadmap 
documents ) as well as the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website for 
guidance documents and updates.
Interpretation
Responding to the 2014 west African Ebola epidemic, this Article adds to the current 
body of knowledge by estimating the potential for, and most likely international 
pathways of Ebola virus spread, using global empirical data for commercial air traﬃ  c 
ﬂ ows at the level of ﬂ ight routes and individual traveller ﬂ ight itineraries. These data, 
along with indicators of health-care capacity can help countries and the international 
community to better assess the potential eﬀ ect of Ebola virus outside of Guinea, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone, the three countries with current intense and widespread transmission. 
The Article also compares the relative eﬃ  ciency of screening airline travellers as they 
depart these countries versus screening travellers as they arrive in airports worldwide. 
These analyses could assist countries in making decisions that balance their risks from 
importations of Ebola virus against the potential harms to Ebola-aﬀ ected countries that 
could occur by disrupting international travel and trade, as required under the 2005 
International Health Regulations. 
For Ebola updates from WHO 
see http://www.who.int/csr/
disease/ebola/en/
For Ebola updates from the CDC 
see http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/
ebola/
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